Has Dr. William Lane Craig Shown that God is Temporal in Relation to the Universe?

Presented to the Socratic Club at CBU by Jonathan Bryan on the October 4th, 2007.

Readers of Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland may remember the Mad Hatter’s claim that there is an advantage in keeping good terms with Time: one could avoid doing those troublesome lessons, which start at nine, by asking the Time to change the clock to half past one, which is time for dinner. After Alice points out that in that case she would not yet be hungry for dinner, the Hatter replies that “you could keep it to half past one as long as you liked.”[1] Perhaps if Alice were a little older and had a degree in philosophy, she might question the Mad Hatter’s concept of time. It must be asked, however, what would make Alice think she really knows better than the Mad Hatter. If Alice is so sure that the Mad Hatter’s concept of time is flawed, what does she think time is? This is a difficult question to answer. For believers in God, a further difficulty is how God should be understood in relation to time. Time is usually thought to be something that everything is in or at. Everything which exists can be said to exist at some point in time, I exist right Now, at this time, but I did not exist 100 years ago. God, on the other hand, exists both right Now and 100 years ago. But what do I mean by this? Do I mean that God existed 100 years ago in the sense that 100 years ago it would be true to say that “God exists right now?” Or do I mean that, to God, 1907 and 2007 are both equally present? The latter view is consistent with the traditional view of most Christian theologians and philosophers – God is not in time like we are, rather God exists outside of time in an “Eternal Now.”[2]

The idea that the creator of the universe is not in time goes at least back to Plato’s Timaeus:

For before the heavens came to be, there were no days or nights, no months or years. But now, at the same time as he [the “Demiurge,” creator of the universe] framed the heavens, he devised their coming to be. These all are parts of time, and was and will be are forms of time that have come to be. Such notions we unthinkingly but incorrectly apply to everlasting being. For we say that it was and is and will be, but according to the true account only is is appropriately said of it. Was and will be are properly said about the becoming that passes time, for these two are motions. But that which is always changeless and motionless cannot become either older or younger in the course of time – it neither ever became so, nor is it now such that it has become so, nor will it ever be so in the future.[3]

Plotinus later elaborated on Plato’s concepts of eternity in his Enneads. Plotinus argues that eternity is “for ever in a Now, since nothing of it has passed away or will come into being, but what it is now, that it is ever.”[4] According to Plato and Plotinus, it is wrong to speak of the “everlasting being” as having a past or future. Instead, it simply is, that is, it exists always in an eternal present. This is how divine timelessness is often described by Christian philosophers.

Boethius writes that the

eternal is that which grasps and possesses wholly and simultaneously the fullness of unending life, which lacks naught of the future, and has lost naught of the fleeting past; and such an existence must be ever present in itself to control and aid itself, and also must keep present with itself the infinity of changing time.”[5]

Recently, many philosophers have raised some arguments against this view of God and time. One of the most interesting arguments against divine timelessness is that it is impossible that God could exist outside of time while being really related to creation, which is in time. Dr. William Lane Craig has recently expressed such an argument in his book Time and Eternity:

Either God existed prior to creation or He did not. Suppose He did. In that case, God is temporal, not timeless, since to exist prior to some event is to be in time. Suppose, then, that God did not exist prior to creation. In that case, without creation, He exists timelessly, since He obviously did not come into being along with the world at the moment of creation. The second alternative presents us with a new dilemma: Once time begins at the moment of creation, either God becomes temporal in virtue of His real relation to the temporal world or else He exists just as timelessly as He does without it. If we choose the first alternative, then, once again, God is temporal. But what of the second alternative? Can God remain untouched by the world’s temporality? It seems not. For at the first moment of time, God stands in a new relation in which He did not stand before (since there was no “before”). Even if in creating the world God undergoes no intrinsic change, He at least undergoes an extrinsic change. For at the moment of creation, God comes into the relation of sustaining the universe or, at the very least, of co-existing with the universe.[6]

Craig’s argument is based on the idea that no kind of change is possible for anything which is not in time. When a seed changes, for example, from a seed to a tree, it is at first a seed, and later becomes a tree. If something changes in any way it must be in time. If God goes from not being co-existent with the universe to being co-existent with the universe, this involves change (even if it is merely an extrinsic change and does not involve a change in God’s character). Thus, according to Craig, God must become temporal when he creates the universe.

The beauty of Craig’s argument is that it avoids some problems concerning the creation of the universe involved with denying divine timelessness. Those who deny divine timelessness are faced with the problem of admitting an infinite duration of time existing prior to creation. If the universe was created at a certain point in time, there were an infinite number of moments in time before the creation of the universe. If this is the case, it is impossible that the moment of creation could ever have been reached. Since, according to Craig, God exists timelessly absent creation but becomes temporal in relation to creation, this is not a problem for Craig. Craig need not respond to the question of “what was God doing before he made the universe?” with “preparing hells for people who inquire into profundities” (as Augustine has quoted someone as doing), but may answer with believers in divine timelessness that the question is nonsensical, for there was no “before” before God made the universe.

With this convenience, however, there appears to be a fatal problem in Craig’s argument. Consider the crucial point, which is that “at the first moment of time, God stands in a new relation in which He did not stand before (since there was no ‘before’).” What does this mean? Here, at least, is what it does not mean:

1. At the time before the creation of the universe, God does not co-exist with the universe.

2. At the time after the creation of the universe, God does co-exist with the universe.

3. Therefore, God at one time was not co-existent with the universe and at another time is co-existent with the universe.

4. Therefore, God changed.

5. Therefore, God is in time.

The problem, of course, is with the tensed words in the first premise. It would be false to say that God is timeless before the universe was created, since there was no “before” before there was time. Craig understands this. Perhaps the first premise can be rephrased to exclude tensed language:

1. Absent creation, God does not co-exist with the universe.

2. With Creation, God does co-exist with the universe.

Now, however, the conclusion does not follow from the premises. It is impossible to get to “God at one time was not co-existent with the universe and at another time is co-existent with the universe” unless the tensed language in premise one is kept, but this is where God is supposed to be timeless. The problem with Craig’s argument, then, is that it unknowingly assumes that time exists where it should not.

In order for a man to say that he changed from being a boy to a man, he must be able to say that there was some time when he existed as a boy. That is, he changed from being a boy to being a man if and only if he was a boy at at least one time previous to being a man. Craig wants to argue that God changed from being unrelated to the universe (absent creation), to being related to the universe (at creation). This would require, however, that God existed at at least one time absent creation. Since, however, time comes into being at the moment of creation, it follows that there was no time absent creation. Therefore there is not one single moment in time when God would have existed absent creation, and thus not one single moment in time when God would have been unrelated to the universe. Where, then, is the change (extrinsic or intrinsic) in God? It seems to me that this particular argument of Dr. Craig’s fails to show that God is temporal in relation to the universe, for now.

---

[1] Carroll, Lewis. Alice in Wonderland & Through The Looking Glass. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 2004. Pg 76.

[2] It may be tempting, in order to secure both God’s transcendence and immanence, to say that God is both outside time and in time. This makes sense so long as by God being “in time,” it is meant that God has access to all points of time. God being “in time,” as it is here being used, however, refers to the idea that God experiences temporal succession. When it is put this way, the idea that God is both outside of and in time is contradictory. If God is in time, God experience phases in his life which can be referred to as “earlier than” or “later than” another phase. If God is outside time, God does not experience these transitions. Thus it is impossible, by this understanding, for God to be both in and outside of time.

[3] Plato. “Timaeus” Plato: Complete Works. Ed. John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. 37e-38a

[4] Plotinus. “Time and Eternity, from the Enneads.” Time. Ed. Jonathan Westphal and Carl Levenson. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993. Pg 73.

[5] Boethius. The Consolation of Philosophy. Trans. W.V. Cooper. London: J.M. Dent, 1902. Electronic Text Center: University of Virginia Library. 24 Nov. 2006 <http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/BoePhil.html> Pg 161.

 

[6] Craig, William Lane. Time and Eternity: Exploring God’s Relationship to Time. Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2001. Pg 86-87.